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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - assembly versus par-
liament - a¤ects the level and composition of local public expenditure. We collect data at the
commune level in Switzerland over the period 1945-2010 and use two research designs: xed-
e¤ects and regression discontinuity (RD) based on local population. Analyzing communes that
switched the form of their legislative institution over time, we nd that introducing a parliament
leads to a 12 percent increase in both general administration and education spending per capita
and an increase in total spending and revenue of about 6 percent. In contrast, regression discon-
tinuity estimates cannot be distinguished from zero for any spending category or overall. These
contrasting results highlight the local nature of discontinuity estimates since population is an
order of magnitude larger in our switcher sample compared to the RD sample. To understand
the mechanism at play, we run a survey among assembly participants and document a sizeable
under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds as well as of women in town meetings compared to
both the electorate and to voters in elections. Switching from assembly democracy to parliament
thus increases the representation of two demographics that are known for their relatively high
preference for education spending.
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1 Introduction
Whether the form of the legislative institution at the local level matters for collective choices is
an open and important question. Citizen assemblies (also called town meetings) are the form
of government in which ordinary citizens gather to legislate. Local parliaments, on the other
hand, are characterized by principals (citizens) delegating decision-making power to their agents
(politicians). In order to improve governance, the World Bank and several aid-organizations have
actively promoted citizen participation in local budgeting decisions for at least two decades (World
Bank, 1996), while Bryan (2004) praises the virtues of town meetings in New England (US). Both
legislative forms are prevalent around the world today after a surge of participatory democracy in
several developing countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and India.
While citizen assemblies seem appealing not least because of their deliberative character,1 what
we ultimately care about is whether they a¤ect policy. Because attending assembly meetings is
time-consuming, theory predicts low and potentially non-representative participation in assembly
democracies (Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner 2000). Voting in elections on the other hand only
requires a trip to the ballot box once every four years or so. Policies may therefore di¤er across
legislative institutions because median voters di¤er. Yet to date very little is known about causal
e¤ects of direct democracy compared to a system of representative democracy (see Tyrefors-
Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014, for a notable exception).
This paper provides some of the rst evidence on the e¤ects of legislative form on the level and
composition of public expenditure. The setting is one of a mature democracy (Switzerland), where
representative and assembly democracy coexist at the local level. Our rst analysis focuses on
cantons where communes have the authority to determine the form of their legislative power.2 To
1Deliberation may motivate citizens to participate in town meetings, may a¤ect their information levels, and
also their opinions on specic issues (Ban et al, 2012; Wantchekon et al, 2017).
2Cantons represent the second and communes the third tier of government in the Swiss federal system.
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get information on the communes current and past legislative forms, we sent our own survey (leg-
islative survey) to all municipalities in these cantons. Based on this survey and other available
information,3 we identied our switcher sample- 77 communes that changed the form of their
legislative institution at least once between 1945 and 2010, most of them abolishing the assembly
in favor of introducing a parliament. We focus on such switcher communes because communes that
always had an assembly or a parliament are likely di¤erent from each other in partly unobservable
dimensions. We did our own data collection in local archives of switcher communes in order to
recover historical public expenditure information. The second analysis exploits a cantonal law (in
the canton Vaud) that prescribes a parliament for communes with more than 800 inhabitants and
lets voters choose their legislative power for communes with up to 800 inhabitants. We identify the
e¤ect of legislative organization on spending using a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design
that pools together administrative data from 5 legislative periods from 1986 to 2005.
Our switcher sample estimates suggest that introducing a parliament leads to an increase in
both general administration spending and education spending of about 12 percent in per capita
terms. For other spending categories, such as welfare, law enforcement, health, and tra¢ c and
environment we nd typically smaller and statistically insignicant e¤ects. Total spending and
revenue increase by about 6 percent. The causal interpretation of these estimates hinges on the
assumption that time-varying unobservables are uncorrelated with parliament adoption within
communes over time. Results are robust to including time-varying controls for population size and
demographic composition. Introducing a commune-specic time trend leaves our results una¤ected
or increases the size of estimated impacts. We further probe our ndings by investigating pre-
adoption e¤ects (which are small and insignicant) and estimating models with leads of varying
length (which also yield small and insignicant e¤ects).
3Administrative data for certain cantons and previous surveys conducted by political scientists (see Section 3
for further information).
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The positive impact of representative democracy on administrative spending is consistent with
rent-extraction (Persson and Tabellini 2000), but also with a mechanical increase due to newly
paid salaries for members of parliament and their sta¤. The positive impact on education spending
suggests that preferences for this type of spending are systematically under-represented in assembly
democracy, which is consistent with predicted low and potentially non-representative assembly
turnout due to participation costs (Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner 2000). Voting costs for Swiss
elections in contrast are particularly low because many cantons introduced postal voting over the
course of our study period (Funk 2010).
To better understand the socio-demographic characteristics of the median voter in assem-
blies and elections, we also ran an assembly survey in which we investigated assembly par-
ticipants gender, age, education, family status and working hours. Results suggest a sizeable
under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds as well as of women in assemblies compared to both
the electorate and to voters in elections. Switching from assembly democracy to parliament thus
increases the representation of two demographics that are known for their relatively high preference
for education spending.4
In contrast to the switcher sample estimates, regression discontinuity estimates cannot be
distinguished from zero for any spending category or overall. The zero e¤ect in our RD analysis
is unlikely to be driven by an invalid research design since there is no evidence of manipulation
of the running variable (commune population) and no evidence of discontinuities in observable
determinants of local spending choices, such as demographic structure, labor force participation
or the share of foreigners in the commune. Moreover, the rst stage is sizeable (about 35 percentage
points) and highly signicant. We are also not aware of other policies or regulations in the canton
4See Figlio and Fletcher (2012) for a summary of the mostly U.S.-based literature on the share of elderly and
support for public education spending and Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) for evidence on Switzerland. See Carruthers
and Wanamaker (2015) for a summary of the evidence on womens greater preference for both private and public
goods and services that enhance child welfare.
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Vaud that are based on the same population threshold, so the exclusion restriction likely holds in
our setting.
We explain the zero e¤ect in the RD sample primarily with commune size since average popu-
lation is an order of magnitude larger in the switcher sample. The principal-agent problem might
be less severe in smaller communes due to stronger social control mechanisms, which may explain
why administrative spending does not increase with the adoption of parliament. Similarly, politi-
cians (and possibly also assembly participants) are more likely to take into account preferences
of non-voters (non-participants) in smaller communes (Ladner and Bühlmann, 2007), which may
explain the small point estimates on other spending categories.5 The sizeable e¤ects of legislative
organization on spending composition for medium-sized but not for small communes highlight the
local nature of discontinuity estimates even in a common institutional setting.
Our paper most directly relates to Tyrefors-Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) who
compare welfare spending under assembly and representative democracy in early 20th century
Sweden after the introduction of universal and equal su¤rage using an RD design based on local
population. The main result is that parliaments spend 40 to 60 percent more on public welfare,
and the evidence points to elite capture in assemblies (where voting is typically non-anonymous
while voting in elections is anonymous) as the principal mechanism. While we do not nd any
e¤ects on welfare spending in either sample this is not very surprising since elite capture is likely
a minor issue in Switzerland during our study period.6
Two other recent studies investigate the related question whether citizen assemblies lead to
a di¤erent resource allocation compared to referenda. Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2017)
5Another explanation is that fuzzy RD-estimates recover an average e¤ect for complier communes - those that
adopt parliament because the rule forces them to do so, while our switcher analysis identies a broader average
e¤ect.
6A recent paper (Sanz, 2017) investigates the e¤ect of direct democracy on total spending for very small com-
munes. Sanz (2017) employs an RD design (population threshold at 100 inhabitants), and deals with the fact that
the density of population size is discontinuous at the cuto¤. His results point towards a negative e¤ect of direct
democracy on total spending (di¤erent spending categories are not analyzed).
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and Olken (2010) compare the types of projects chosen under citizen assemblies and secret ballot
referenda, where villagers directly vote on projects. Both studies take place in developing countries
(Indonesia in Olken, 2010, and Afghanistan in Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2017). While
referenda not only diminish the inuence of elites on chosen projects (this result comes out more
clearly in Beath et al.), they also lead to signicantly higher citizen satisfaction. Again, a key
di¤erence between these papers and ours is the setting: Switzerland has been a mature democracy
since long before 1945 and elite capture is likely to be absent.
Apart from the direct link to the before-mentioned literature on local direct democratic institu-
tions, our paper also relates to a recent strand of literature using credible identication strategies
to estimate the causal e¤ect of electoral institutions on a variety of policy outcomes (e.g. Miller,
2008; Fujiwara, 2015; Hainmüller and Hangartner, 2015; León, 2017). And nally, our paper adds
to a sizeable literature analyzing direct democratic elements (initiatives and referenda) within
representative governments (see Matsusaka, 2004, for an overview of the earlier literature).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents institutional background on the Swiss
federal system. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses identifying assumptions and the
estimation approach for our two research designs. Section 5 presents estimation results. Section 6
provides evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Communal autonomy
Switzerland is a federal state with three layers of government: the federal level, the cantonal
level, and the communal level. Political responsibilities remain with the cantons unless they were
granted to the federal government in a national referendum. As a consequence, cantons have a lot
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of autonomy in the provision of public goods and the choice of political institutions. The degree of
communal autonomy is regulated by canton laws, which leads to substantial heterogeneity across
cantons. For instance, some cantons mandate political institutions at the commune level, while
other cantons let the communes choose freely.
For our commune-xed-e¤ect analysis we focus on the fourteen cantons that allow local choice
of the legislative institution (see online Appendix Table 1).7 We exclude communes from canton
Ticino, since most of the local institutional variation was generated by commune mergers. Other
cantons, such as Neuchâtel and Geneva, prescribe a parliament for all communes or mandate that
legislative decisions at the local level are made at the assembly or at the ballot box (cantons
Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri).
For our RD analysis we use communes from the canton Vaud, where the legislation prescribes a
parliament for communes with more than 800 inhabitants and allows local choice between parlia-
ment and assembly for communes with up to 800 inhabitants.8 Population thresholds also exist for
communes in cantons Fribourg, Vallis and Zürich, which are included in our xed-e¤ect analysis,
but the number of communes around these cuto¤s is small and the assignment rule sometimes
di¤ers, mandating an assembly below the cuto¤ and allowing choice above.
2.2 Commune responsibilities
In addition to the heterogeneity in communal autonomy across cantons, the distribution of respon-
sibilities for communal and cantonal public service provision also di¤ers across cantons. Typically,
however, commune responsibilities include preschool and primary education (grades 1 through 5
or 6), welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c, among others. For the medium-sized communes in
7In all but one canton (Scha¤hausen) there were actual switches of legislative institutions during our sample
period.
8In 2005 the cuto¤ was raised from 800 to 1,000 inhabitants.
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our switcher sample, responsibilities typically also include lower secondary education (grades 6
or 7 through 9). The bulk of communal spending is on education, welfare, tra¢ c and general
administration (Tables 1 and 2). As for total communal spending relative to cantonal and federal
spending, communes undertook 24% of total spending, the cantons 42%, and the federal level the
remaining 34% in the year 2010. A large share of local expenditures is nanced through a local
income tax.
2.3 Commune organization and political rights
Decision-making bodies at local level include the executive (usually called Gemeinderat), the leg-
islative, organized as either assembly or parliament, the electorate, and special committees for
example for nancial a¤airs. The exact division of powers in the budget process varies across
communes but typically it is characterized as follows. The executive implements approved expen-
ditures and drafts the budget proposal in consultation with the nance committee. The legislative
votes on the budget proposal and controls the execution of past expenditures. Participants at
assemblies can propose budgetary items for deliberation. Budgetary decisions are taken by simple
majority in an open vote, except if a secret vote is requested and approved. Under both legislative
forms, the nal say on the budget may rest with the electorate, either through mandatory or
facultative referendum - that is, when a su¢ cient number of citizens ask for a vote at the ballot
box.
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3 Data
3.1 The switcher sample
To gather information on the institutional history of todays 2,551 Swiss communes, we sent an
e-mail with a link to an online survey to all municipal secretaries on April 27 2011. We asked for
information about the organization of the legislative since 1945, but also for other institutional
information (presence of initiative and referendum rights and corresponding changes since 1945).
After sending reminder e-mails and calling 1,120 communes, we obtained a survey response rate
(complete or partial) of 48.6% for our study cantons (see online Appendix Table 1).
From the 881 communes that responded to our survey there were 32 that had changed the
form of their legislative power between 1945 and 2010. For 25 switchers, we had all the necessary
information (year of the switch), because they had completed the relevant survey module. For 7
communes, we were missing the precise year of the switch. To gather this missing information,
we checked available local constitutions or called up the commune secretaries. For the 51.4% of
non-responders and another 129 respondents that only gave the current status of the legislative
power, we complement our analysis with previous surveys conducted by political scientists. In
four di¤erent waves (1988, 1994, 1998 and 2005) Professor Ladner and his team elicited detailed
information on the political structure (including legislative form) of local governments.
As can be seen in online Appendix Table 1, response rates in these Ladner surveys were
high. Most important for us is that for communes that lled out all the Ladner surveys, we can
reconstruct the entire institutional history between 1945 and 2005. The reason is that the surveys
did not only inquire about the current state of the legislative but also about past attempts to
change the form of the legislative power. As such, if a commune answered in the 1988 survey that
it had an assembly and no e¤ort had been undertaken to introduce a parliament in the past, we
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can assume that they had an assembly all the way back to 1945. As a last source of information,
we used cantonal administrative information wherever available.9
Combining these three sources of information (our survey, the Ladner surveys, and cantonal
information on parliaments for four cantons) we identied 77 communes that had changed the
form of their legislative power, mostly abandoning the citizen assembly in favor of introducing a
parliament. As can be seen from Figure 1, the switcher sample is spread out all over Switzerland.
Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity in the time of institutional change across communes
(see online Appendix Figures 1 and 2).
What were the main reasons for the system change? One of the key arguments in favour of
introducing a parliament was potentially better representation. Especially in large communes,
turnout in assemblies was very low (often less than 10 percent), which raised concerns about
representation. Frequently heard arguments against having parliaments were a potentially stronger
inuence of political parties and lobbyists. Since a communes population size may be a key factor
for the decision to adopt a parliament, we control for population size in the regressions.
3.2 Local budgetary data for the switcher sample
Since standardized data in electronic format was only available for a subset of cantons for the more
recent years (starting in 1980 or 1990), most of the budgetary data had to be collected in the eld.
This required rst contacting each of the 77 sample communes (by phone and/or e-mail), to ask
for access to their local archives, and then to make all the necessary arrangements for the archive
visit. This process often involved several steps, and in some cases even involved formal requests
to the local executive body, as access to the archive was rst denied. Arrangements were made
9For the canton Freiburg, we know the communities with a parliament today (15), and also the year it was
introduced. For the cantons Aargau, Valais and Zuerich, we got a list of all communities that have or ever had a
parliament. Since we did not know the year in which the parliament was introduced (and/or potentially abolished),
we checked the websites for these communes or called them up to get this missing information.
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with the head of the nancial department, the municipal clerk, or the municipal archivist. The
e¤orts required for reviewing the documents varied by commune and depending on canton-specic
transparency laws. In the end, we managed to get access to every single communal archive in our
switcher sample. Only a few communes had missing information, mostly for earlier years.
We collected data on total revenue and total expenditure, as well as expenditures broken down
by spending category. This so-called functional division classies expenditure items by the service
categories carried out by the commune. Harmonizing the categories for functional expenditure
over time and across communes was a major challenge. By 2010, the nancial accounting systems
of cantons and communes were largely standardized according to the Harmonized Accounting
Model (HAM-1) and applied all over Switzerland (most communes adopted the HAM-1 in the
1980s). In earlier years, however, accounting systems varied across cantons and time, and even
slightly within cantons.
To be as consistent as possible, we proceeded as follows: (a) If the sub-division in the raw data
for earlier years was more detailed than under the later HAM-1, we aggregated the items into
the corresponding HAM-1-category, as close as possible in line with o¢ cial guidelines. (b) If the
data was more aggregated than the HAM-1 (e. g. "Education" and "Public Security and Health"
together), we adopted the coinciding category (Education), and set missing values for the non-
separable categories (Public Security; Health). (c) In the years prior to the HAM-1, it is generally
not possible to sharply disentangle the two HAM-1-categories "Tra¢ c" and "Environment and
Spatial Planning", but we can at least identify the items that would correspond to either of the
two under the HAM-1. We summarize all these items by the single meta-category "Tra¢ c and
Environment", which simply becomes the sum of the two HAM-1-categories from the 1980s. We
coded every change in the communes accounting system and control for these structural breaks
using dummy variables in the regressions.
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3.3 The RD sample
For the sake of comparability, our RD analysis is based on a population range from 400 to 1,200
inhabitants, i.e. +/- 400 around the 800 cuto¤. Local population is based on administrative data
from the population o¢ ce of canton Vaud. The reference population for the 4-year legislative
period from year t to t+3 is population at the end of year t-2, with elections being held in the fall
of year t-1. We identied commune-years with reference population in the 400-1,200 interval for
the ve legislative periods 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005. We exclude
more recent legislative periods because the cuto¤ for local legislative form choice was raised to
1,000 inhabitants in 2005. For communes in the 400-800 interval, we determined the status of the
legislative power using communal constitutions and minutes from actual assemblies and parliament
sessions. For those in the 801-1,200 interval we simply impute a parliament after doing some cross-
checks, again using local constitutions and session minutes. For communes from the canton Vaud,
local budgetary data are available from the statistical o¢ ce starting from 1985.
Tables 2 and 3 show the budget categories we use in our switcher- and RD-analysis, respec-
tively. In the switcher sample the largest budget category is education, followed by tra¢ c and
environment and welfare, while in the RD sample education spending is most important, followed
by administrative spending and an aggregate welfare and health spending category. Note that
the period of observation for the budgetary data from Vaud covers the 4-year legislative cycle,
while in the switcher sample the data are annual. Since we run all regressions in logs, level di¤er-
ences across the two samples are inconsequential for interpretation of the results. Other budget
categories, such as "Properties and Buildings" or "Construction", are only available in either the
switcher or the RD sample. There is no impact of parliament adoption on these other categories.
Results are available on request.
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3.4 Political participation survey
One key di¤erence between assembly and representative democracy is the level of political partic-
ipation or turnout. Indeed, our leading hypothesis is that turnout increases when parliamentary
elections are introduced, which in turn may alter the median voters preferences. Ideally, we would
therefore like to provide direct evidence on political participation from our switcher sample at dif-
ferent points in time. Unfortunately however, there are no historical data on turnout in assemblies
or in local legislative elections. We draw instead on a recent country-wide survey of municipal
clerks (Ladner 2009) that inquired about patterns of participation in assemblies and local execu-
tive elections. While turnout is only available for local executive - not legislative - elections, we
veried for recent elections in our switcher sample that local executive and legislative turnout are
highly correlated (results available on request). We therefore think it is reasonable to assume that
similar participation patterns also characterized earlier periods.
3.5 Assembly survey
In order to understand whether assembly participants di¤er from voters in elections and from the
electorate at large, we conducted our own survey in canton Zürich communes during the fall of
2016. Out of the 154 communes in canton Zürich with a citizen assembly, 62 agreed to participate in
the survey. We decided to gather assembly participantscharacteristics at the budgetassembly,
which is when the upcoming years budget is decided.
At the start of the assembly, the municipal clerk explained to participants that the survey was
part of a study nanced by the Swiss national science foundation investigating the functioning
of citizen assemblies. The municipal clerk also encouraged assembly participants to ll out the
survey, explaining that anonymity was guaranteed and that the survey would take less than ve
minutes to ll out. The survey itself consisted of two pages and asked about gender, age, family
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status, education and labor market status. The municipal clerk counted the total number of
assembly participants so that we could assess the response rate, which was 66 percent on average.
As a robustness check we also looked only at communes with response rates larger than 70 percent
and found quantitatively similar results (available on request).
3.6 Electorate characteristics
From the statistical o¢ ce of canton Zürich we obtained information on the set of individuals
eligible to vote (Swiss citizens, aged 18 years and above). Data on age are administrative and
cover the entire population of the canton, while data on education, family structure and hours
worked are collected as part of an annual survey (Strukturerhebung) run jointly by the federal
government and cantonal authorities.10 We aggregate each variable across all individuals living in
the 62 communes that participated in our assembly survey.
3.7 Voter characteristics
Local parliament elections take place every four years and voting is either done by mail or at the
ballot box. Because there are no commune-level surveys of voter characteristics, we rely on post-
national-election surveys (Swiss Electoral Studies) that are representative at the cantonal, not
local level. Respondents were contacted in the weeks following an election and asked information
on gender, age, education, income, and civil status.11 We combine the 2011 and 2015 survey rounds
to obtain a total sample size of 1,127 respondents who participated in the respective preceding
national elections.
10See https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/erhebungen/se.html for further infor-
mation.
11Until the year 2011, interviews were done by telephone, and starting from the election in 2015, the researchers
use both telephone and online methods. A description of the surveys and all the data can be found on the following
webpage: http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/selects/.
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One natural question is whether voters in national elections di¤er from voters in cantonal or
local elections. To address this concern, we exploit an earlier post-national-election survey from
2007 that asked about participation in both federal and cantonal elections. Comparing the charac-
teristics of voters in federal and cantonal elections, we nd that they are almost identical (results
available upon request). Moreover, an even earlier survey from 2003 asked about respondents
interest in local and cantonal politics on a scale from one to four. Among voters in cantonal
elections, average interest in local politics was 2.88, while for cantonal politics it was 2.86. It
therefore seems reasonable to expect socio-demographic characteristics of voters in cantonal and
local elections to be similar.
3.8 Control variables
Control variables (commune population, demographic structure, labor force participation rate, and
share foreigners) are from the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce (Bundesamt für Statistik). Control
variables are interpolated between census years, except for commune population which is based
on yearly administrative data for the canton Vaud and for the switcher sample between 1981 and
2010. As can be seen from the summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2, the communes of canton
VD are comparable to the communes in the switcher sample in terms of age structure, labor force
participation or the share of foreigners. However, the communes in the RD sample are much
smaller compared to the communes in the switcher sample (a mean of 688 inhabitants versus a
mean of 8,532 inhabitants).
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4 Identication and estimation approach
4.1 Fixed-e¤ects analysis
Let Yct denote spending in a given category in commune c and period t, Dct the indicator for
parliament (1) or assembly (0),  the (constant) e¤ect of parliament relative to assembly, Xct
commune population, demographic controls (share of population in age brackets 20-39, 40-64, 65
and above), labor force participation rate and share foreigners, c commune xed-e¤ects, t time
xed-e¤ects, and Uct the inuence of unobserved additional factors that a¤ect outcomes. The
baseline specication is as follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct + Xct + c + t + Uct: (1)
The causal interpretation of xed-e¤ects estimates hinges on the assumption that time-varying
unobservables are uncorrelated with parliament adoption, conditional on the commune- and time
xed-e¤ects and time-varying controls. We control for population to address the concern that the
likelihood of parliament adoption increases with population size. We also control for commune
demographics since the age prole of the population is a potential determinant of public spending
priorities, as are labor force participation and the share foreigners in the commune. Results
without time-varying controls are quantitatively similar and are available on request. Our second
specication additionally controls for commune-specic linear trends ct. The third specication
in addition controls for commune-specic breaks in the local accounting system.
We further probe our ndings by estimating models with leads and lags of varying length:
ln(Yct) = 0Dct +
LX
l=1
 lDct l +
FX
f=1
+fDct+f + Xct + c + t + Uct: (2)
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We test the joint signicance of the L lags and F lead coe¢ cients separately. The test on the lags
tells us whether part of the impact of parliament on spending occurs with a lag. The test on the
leads tells us whether introducing a parliament in the future already has e¤ects on spending today,
which is possible due to anticipation e¤ects, or more worrisome, due to endogeneity of adoption.
As a nal robustness check on pre-adoption e¤ects, let Prect  denote a dummy variable equal
to 1 for each of  pre-adoption years. The omitted category is thus assembly periods other than
those covered by Prect  = 1. The model is as follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct +  Prect  + Xct + c + t + ct+ Uct: (3)
We let  range from 1 to 4 and for each specication test the hypothesis that the post-adoption
e¤ect is the same as the pre-adoption e¤ect  =   :
4.2 RD design
The basic intuition behind the regression discontinuity design is that communes just to the left of
the 800 population cuto¤ should provide valid counterfactual outcomes for communes just to the
right of the cuto¤ where parliament is mandatory. More formally, let Zct = I[popct > 800] denote
the indicator for being above the population cuto¤, popct commune population, f(popct   800)
and g(popct   800) linear or quadratic splines in normalized population, and Vct the inuence of
unobserved additional factors that a¤ect parliament adoption, in addition to Z. The model is as
follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct + f(popct   800) + Uct; (4)
Dct = Zct + g(popct   800) + Vct: (5)
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If E[U jpop] and E[V jpop] are continuous, the exclusion restriction holds, and if there is a rst
stage ( > 0), then the ratio of the reduced-form coe¢ cient divided by the rst stage coe¢ cient
 identies :12 Throughout the paper, we focus on reduced form estimates in order to maintain
a close correspondence with the graphical evidence.
Intuitively, the continuity assumption requires that unobservables vary smoothly as a function
of commune population and, in particular, do not jump at the cuto¤. As shown in Lee and Lemieux
(2010), su¢ cient for the continuity assumption is the assumption that individual densities of the
treatment-determining variable are smooth. In our case, this assumption explicitly allows for
communes to have some control over their particular number of inhabitants. As long as this
control is imprecise, treatment assignment is essentially randomized around the cuto¤. Precise
control over resident population is unlikely because local population is recorded by cantonal and
not communal authorities. We are also not aware of other policies or regulations in the canton
Vaud that are based on the 800 population threshold, so the exclusion restriction likely holds in
this setting.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Switcher sample results
Table 3 shows estimation results of equation (1) for spending categories in the switcher sample.
Introducing a parliament increases administrative spending and education spending per capita
by about 12 percent in the most demanding specication with commune-specic time trends and
structural break dummies. The estimate on health spending per capita is of the same order of
12With heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and imperfect compliance, the ratio of RD-gaps identies a local average
treatment e¤ect "close" to the cuto¤. This result requires the monotonicity assumption which in our case says that
communes that adopted a parliament with population below the cuto¤ would have also adopted parliament had
their population been above the cuto¤. This seems uncontroversial.
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magnitude but imprecise. Impact estimates for welfare, law enforcement and tra¢ c and environ-
ment spending are all small and statistically not signicant. Overall, total spending and revenue
increase by about 6 percent (result available on request).
Table 4 presents results from equation (2), testing whether introducing a parliament in the
future already has e¤ects on spending in the present and whether part of the impact arises with
a lag. The estimates of the dynamic cumulative 4-year e¤ect (sum of contemporaneous and four
lagged coe¢ cient estimates) for administrative and education spending are only slightly larger than
the impact estimates in Table 3, suggesting that essentially the entire e¤ect is realized on impact.13
There is no evidence of impacts arising with a lag for other spending categories either, except
perhaps for positive estimates on health spending and negative estimates on tra¢ c/environment
spending that are both marginally signicant at 10 percent. Turning to the cumulative pre-
adoption e¤ects (sum of four lead coe¢ cients), Table 4 shows that these estimates are uniformly
small and insignicant across spending categories and specications.
Table 2 in the online Appendix shows results from estimating equation (3) where in addition
to the indicator variable (parliament 0/1), dummies for time-periods prior to the legal change are
included. Pre-adoption e¤ects are small and statistically insignicant for all spending categories.
Moreover, for administrative and education spending, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
e¤ect on spending  periods prior to adoption is the same as after the adoption. Overall, the
econometric evidence strongly suggests that estimates of the e¤ect of adopting a parliament on
education and administrative spending in the switcher sample are causal.
13Specications with alternative lead- and lag-lengths are quantitatively similar and available on request.
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5.2 RD sample results
We now turn to the regression discontinuity analysis of parliament adoption on budget allocation
in canton Vaud. Before comparing spending of communes around the 800 population cuto¤, we
visually check whether there is sorting around the threshold. Figure 2 conrms that there is no
bunching on either side of the threshold and the McCrary density test gives a log di¤erence in
height at the cuto¤ of -.035 with standard error 0.276. In addition, Table 5 shows that observables
appear continuous at the 800 population cuto¤. Overall, these results are consistent with the
smooth density assumption required for identication.
We proceed with estimating the rst stage coe¢ cient  in equation (5). As shown in Table 6
rst row (and visualized in Figure 3), the probability of having a parliament jumps by about 35
percentage points for communes with 801 compared to those with 800 inhabitants. Comparing
now di¤erent types of spending at the cuto¤, Table 6 shows that the reduced form estimates
uctuate around zero and are insignicant throughout with only one exception (see also Figures
4 and 5 for administrative and education spending, respectively). Implied instrumental variable
estimates of parliament adoption can be obtained by multiplying the reduced form estimates by
three. Results using optimal bandwidths as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) as
well as bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014) are similar and available on request.
We conclude that the e¤ect of representative (versus assembly) democracy on spending is
essentially zero in small communes, although the standard errors are admittedly quite large and
we cannot rule out sizeable e¤ects in either direction. While we cannot reject that the e¤ects
for administrative and education spending are the same across the RD and switcher samples, the
patterns are clearly di¤erent - RD estimates bounce around zero while xed-e¤ects estimates are
consistently positive. Overall, these results highlight the local nature of discontinuity estimates
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since population is an order of magnitude larger in our switcher sample compared to the RD
sample.
6 Mechanisms
What are likely mechanisms driving these result, starting with the positive e¤ect on education
spending in the switcher sample? Our leading hypothesis is that turnout increases when par-
liamentary elections are introduced and that this induces a shift towards a pivotal voter with
higher preferences for education spending. Figure 6 supports the rst step in this causal chain,
documenting that turnout in communal executive elections is indeed an order of magnitude higher
than participation in assemblies for a large sample of communes from all over Switzerland.
Moving to our assembly survey results from canton Zürich, Panel A of Figure 7 provides ev-
idence that assembly participants are signicantly older than the electorate in communes that
participated in our assembly survey. As is evident from that gure, 20- to 40-year-olds are par-
ticularly under-represented in those communes. While the average Swiss citizen is 50.9 years old,
average age of assembly participants is 57.1. Panel B of Figure 7 shows that 20- to 40-year-olds
are under-represented in assemblies also compared to canton Zürich voters who participated in
national elections (the average voter is 52.8 years old).
In addition, Panel A of Figure 8 shows that women are under-represented in assemblies com-
pared to their proportion in the electorate in the set of communes that participated in our assembly
survey. While the proportion of females among Swiss citizens is about 0.51, the proportion of fe-
male assembly participants is only 0.40. Similarly, Panel B of Figure 8 shows that women are
also under-represented in assemblies when compared to canton Zürich voters in national elections
in which about 48 percent are female. Results for other characteristics are less clear-cut. For
example, Figure 3 in the online Appendix shows that the average level of education is similar
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among assembly participants and canton Zürich voters in national elections.
A natural concern is whether these results generalize beyond canton Zürich. We again take
advantage of the 2009 survey of municipal clerks, who were asked about their subjective opinion
regarding which groups of people are over- or under-represented at assemblies in their commune.
Reassuringly, we nd that municipal clerks tend to view young people and women as being under-
represented at assemblies, while highly-educated people seem to be proportionally represented
(results available on request). Together, these results suggest that switching from assembly democ-
racy to parliament tends to increase the representation of women and middle-aged citizens, two
demographics that are known for their relatively high preference for education spending (Figlio
and Fletcher 2012, Cattaneo and Wolter 2009, Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015).
Turning to our explanation for the zero e¤ect in the RD analysis, we think that the main
reason is commune size: average commune size is 8,532 in the switcher sample (Table 1), but
a mere 688 in the canton Vaud (Table 2). The principal-agent problem is therefore likely less
severe in smaller communes due to stronger social control mechanisms, which may explain why
administrative spending does not increase with the adoption of parliament. Similarly, politicians
(and possibly also assembly participants) are more likely to take into account preferences of non-
voters (non-participants) in smaller communes (Ladner and Bühlmann 2007), which may explain
the zero e¤ect on other spending categories.
7 Conclusion
We have empirically investigated whether the choice of legislative institution matters for the level
and composition of local government spending in Switzerland over the period 1945-2010. Our
answer is mixed: the form of the legislative does not seem to matter for small communes, but it
matters for medium-sized communes. We nd that introducing a parliament leads to a 12 percent
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increase in both general administration and education spending per capita and a 6 percent increase
in total spending and revenue. While rent seeking and the cost of running a parliament can explain
the increase in administrative spending, they are unlikely to account for the increase in education
spending. A more likely mechanism is a change in the identity and preferences of the pivotal voter.
Legislative elections (compared to assemblies) increase the representation of middle-aged citizens
and women, two groups that tend to be relatively favorable to public spending on education.
Overall, these results suggest that the form of the local legislative institution matters for budget
allocation and that the benets of direct citizen participation may come at the cost of selective
representation. Future research might therefore investigate ways to give under-represented groups
more voice in the assembly decision-making process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the switcher sample
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Form of the local legislative power (authors' data collection)
Parliament (1), Assembly (0) 5.082 0.506 0.500 0 1
Local budgetary data (authors' data collection)
Total revenue per capita 4.762 3.702 2.562 134 30.273
Total spending per capita 4.790 3.659 2.520 164 30.273
Administrative spending per capita 4.797 370 287 16 2.620
Welfare spending per capita 4.285 437 495 0 3.543
Law enforcement spending per capita 4.329 149 126 0 1.234
Education spending per capita 4.502 755 507 3 2.848
Health spending per capita 3.400 150 151 0 1.056
Traffic and environment spending per capita 4.680 632 650 0 7.587
Control variables (Bundesamt für Statistik)
Resident population 5.082 8.532 6.052 404 29.006
Labor force participation rate  (%) 5.082 61.8 4.6 46.5 79.1
Share of 0- to 19-year-olds (%) 5.082 28.8 6.1 14.9 45.7
Share of 20- to 39-year-olds (%) 5.082 30.5 4.2 13.9 53.0
Share of 40- to 64-year-olds (%) 5.082 28.9 3.9 16.9 45.5
Share of at least 65-year-olds (%) 5.082 11.8 4.4 2.7 30.0
Share foreigners (%) 5.082 15.4 9.5 0 53.8
Notes: The unit of observation is a commune-year. The sample period ranges from 1945 to 2010. Budgetary
data are in year 2010 Swiss Francs based on the consumer price index. Control variables are from the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für Statistik). Resident population is based on administrative data from 1981
to 2010 and interpolated from census data between 1945 and 1980. The other control variables are interpolated
based on census data.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the RD sample
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Form of the local legislative power (authors' data collection)
Parliament (1), Assembly (0) 531 0.555 0.497 0 1
Local budgetary data (Statistique VD)
Total revenue per capita 531 19.189 5.669 8.472 69.736
Total spending per capita 531 19.196 5.613 8.556 69.626
Administrative spending per capita 531 2.378 938 695 7.678
Welfare and health spending per capita 531 1.760 1.618 223 8.203
Law enforcement spending per capita 531 491 286 134 2.894
Education spending per capita 531 3.728 1.369 872 15.405
Traffic and environment spending per capita 531 1.014 644 0.069 4.133
Control variables (Bundesamt für Statistik and Statistique VD)
Reference population 531 688.6 216.6 401 1197
Labor force participation rate  (%) 531 64.3 6.9 36.6 99.0
Share of 0- to 19-year-olds (%) 531 26.4 3.9 16.3 41.0
Share of 20- to 39-year-olds (%) 531 28.3 4.6 15.7 51.4
Share of 40- to 64-year-olds (%) 531 33.0 4.5 16.4 52.2
Share of at least 65-year-olds (%) 531 13.1 4.5 2.9 30.0
Share foreigners (%) 531 13.7 7.5 2.1 41.2
Notes:  The unit of observation is a commune in a 4-year legislative period. The sample period ranges from 1986
to 2005. Commune-legislative periods are included in the sample if the reference population falls within the interval
(400, 1200). Reference population refers to the year preceding the legislative period. Budgetary data are in year
2010 Swiss Francs based on the consumer price index. Reference population is based on administrative records
from the Statistical Office of canton Vaud (Statistique VD). The other control variables are interpolated based on
census data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für Statistik).
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Figure 7: Age of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich communes that took part in our 2016 assembly
survey. Assembly participants responded to our survey. The electorate corresponds to Swiss
citizens and is based on register data collected by the statistical office of canton Zürich.
Panel A: Assembly vs. Electorate
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich. Assembly participants are from those communes
that took part in our 2016 assembly survey. Voters in national elections participated in the Swiss
Electoral Studies surveys of 2011 or 2015 and are from the entire canton.
Panel B: Assembly vs. Voters in Elections
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Figure 8: Gender of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich communes that took part in our 2016 assembly
survey. Assembly participants responded to our survey. The electorate corresponds to Swiss
citizens and is based on register data collected by the statistical office of canton Zürich.
Panel A: Assembly vs. Electorate
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich. Assembly participants are from those communes
that took part in our 2016 assembly survey. Voters in national elections participated in the Swiss
Electoral Studies surveys of 2011 or 2015 and are from the entire canton.
Panel B: Assembly vs. Voters in Elections
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